Paradoxes in Sequential Voting
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We show that strategic voting in these voting procedures may lead to a very undesirable outcome: Condorcet winning alternative might be rejected, Condorcet losing alternative might be elected, and Pareto dominated alternative might be elected. These undesirable phenomena occur already with four alternatives and a small number of voters. For the case of three alternatives we present positive and negative results.
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Oren Dean (add twitter)
Yakov Babichenko (add twitter)
Moshe Tennenholtz (add twitter)
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07/12/18 09:15PM
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